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The New Zealand government has introduced a COVID-19 domestic vaccine pass to be used in conjunction with the COVID-19 Protection Framework. The Framework is likely to be activated soon after Cabinet meets on 29 November 2021. The pass will be necessary to access places and events that require proof of vaccination under the Framework. This brief does not argue for or against the introduction of a domestic vaccine pass, but rather discusses key issues that it raises for Māori, and suggests actions to address them. We see four key issues: • the lack of Māori involvement, as a Tiriti partner, on either the design or implementation of the COVID-19 domestic vaccine pass; • disproportionate restriction on Māori mobility due to lower Māori vaccination rates; • privacy and data security concerns; • uneven implementation that could increase discrimination against Māori and other groups considered to pose a risk to others’ safety. To respond to these issues we recommend that the implementation of the pass be designed in partnership with Māori and comply with Māori data sovereignty requirements. As Tiriti partners, Māori should expect that the pass will keep their communities safe, while providing opportunities to enact manaakitanga in the matrix of care, and the mana to manage their own affairs.

The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 caused many New Zealanders grave concern. In this article I suggest that a number of the Government's actions since the passing of the Foreshore and Seabed Act bring into question several of its central claims for legislating and the subsequent overriding of Tiriti o Waitangi and human rights laws. As a result, I argue that the inadequacy in our constitutional arrangements requires a change of approach—a new game plan: constitutional change. The second part of the article examines the work of the Maori Party. Its actions in encouraging an increasing level of Maori politicisation away from expression outside the State and towards the electoral process, arising out of opposition to the Foreshore and Seabed Act, constitute another changing of game plans. The article concludes by emphasising how the Foreshore and Seabed Act has encouraged us to take a longer term vision in order to foster more positive relations, a vision that encompasses the need for genuine constitutional change based on respect for human rights and Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

In this article, I outline the existing legislative options available and rationale for M?ori representation in local government. I suggest that the arguments and rationale against M?ori representation have been exacerbated by a lack of clarity around local government?s duties and obligations stemming from the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In the second part of this article, I explore more recent arguments by M?ori for representation and involvement in local government decision-making on the basis of being mana whenua, which means to have territorial authority and power associated with the possession and occupation of tribal land. This argument foregrounds specific iwi (tribes) as holding territorial authority and therefore rights to representation and involvement in decision-making sourced in tikanga M?ori (M?ori law), over and above other M?ori who live in that area. I examine in detail the Rotorua District Council?s establishment of the Te Arawa Partnership Board in 2015 and argue that this Board and its first election results provide unique insights into the relationship between Te Arawa people living in and outside the district and has implications for broader conversations about the rights of M?ori living away from their tribal areas.

The election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous President of Bolivia in 2005 is widely credited to the Cochamba Water War (Spronk 2007: 8). The Cochamba Water War progressed from an indigenous movement and a specific issue to the creation of an indigenous political party and election of the first indigenous President. The Bolivian water war, the Puebla Panama Plan in Mexico, the Mackenzie Valley pipeline in Canada (Altamirano‐Jiménez 2004) and Māori resistance to the neoliberal agenda from 1984 onwards (Bargh 2007: 26) inspired much theorising about indigenous people successfully contesting neoliberalism (AltamiranoJiménez 2004, Bargh 2007, Spronk 2007: 8, Postero 2007). Bargh and others, for example, documented not only ‘overt Māori resistance to neoliberal policies, but also more subtle stories of activities, which The neoliberal state, recognition and indigenous rights implicitly challenge neoliberal practices and assumptions by their support for other ways of living’ (Bargh 2007: 1). Scholars make visible the persistence of the colonial in the concrete and material conditions of everyday neoliberal governance and life (Howard-Wagner & Kelly 2011: 103). As Bargh (2007), Altamirano-Jiménez (2013), Howard-Wagner (2010b, 2015) and others note, indigenous categorisations of neoliberal practices as a form of colonisation relate to a concern that neoliberalism in its multiple forms poses a threat to indigenous ways of life. This scholarship also critically reflects on the reshaping of the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples under neoliberalism (Altamirano-Jiménez 2004, Bargh 2007, Howard-Wagner 2009). For example, it draws attention to the increasing intervention in the lives of indigenous peoples (Howard-Wagner 2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and the dispossession of indigenous people through privatisation (Wolfe 2006, Howard-Wagner 2012, Altamirano-Jiménez 2013, Coulthard 2014). It does not, however, preclude agency, resistance and decolonisation. Interpretive micro-studies about indigenous peoples’ engagement with neoliberalism provide particular value. They tell us about actually existing neoliberalism in the context of intervention in the everyday lives of indigenous peoples, contests over rights, contests over policy and the complex decisions indigenous people are making about how to protect their rights and navigate diverse economies involving neoliberal policies and practices.

This paper identifies three discourses that are prominent in contemporary Treaty of Waitangi policy debate, each with significantly different implications for Maori political status within the modern nation-state. At one extreme the Treaty's significance is exaggerated by overemphasis on partnership as an implicit Treaty principle. At another extreme the Treaty's significance is understated by an assimilationist position that denies the Treaty's relevance to Indigenous rights which, in turn, imposes serious constraint on the extent to which partnership can actually develop into comprehensive policy practice. An alternative position is one that sees the Treaty, which is supported in international law, as affirming a twofold conception of citizenship as the basis of both individual and collective Maori rights.

Reconciliation brings together Christological and anthropological dimensions of human thought to illustrate the nexus between religious principles and political means. For the state reconciliation is concerned with social cohesion and political stability. For the church, it extends the sacramental notion of reconciliation between God and penitent to public relationships. This article examines Roman Catholic contributions to secular reconciliation debates. It shows how religious precepts create moral imperatives to engagement with secular discourses as a necessary element of Christian mission. It also argues that the church’s role in the disruption of indigenous societies creates an additional moral imperative to engage in reconciliation as mission and to articulate a Christian vision of indigenous rights.

Māori knowledge, memory and cultural strength will only enhance New Zealand’s economic recovery planning – if they are listened to.

Similar to experiences of Indigenous peoples globally, Māori in the nation-state known as New Zealand (NZ) have been subjected to mass incarceration by the colonial state. Places of detention are dangerous environments for the spread of COVID-19. We are deeply concerned about the potential for disproportionate impacts of COVID-19 on Māori and other Indigenous peoples within these environments as many have health conditions and/or multiple comorbidities compounding the risks of severe illness and death from COVID-19. We call for the NZ government to honour te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations and uphold Indigenous rights contained within the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other international rights instruments. A whole-of-government commitment to an equitable public health approach is required to: 1) rapidly reduce the numbers of Māori in sites of detention; 2) implement effective, timely, evidenced informed measures to reduce the risk of COVID-19, in line with World Health Organization recommendations; 3) prevent the torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of detained Māori during COVID-19; and, 4) eliminate double-celling. Although focused on NZ, the themes we highlight are likely of relevance for Indigenous peoples across the globe in our collective resistance to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Comprehensive exploration of Māori experiences of discrimination in Aotearoa New Zealand remains limited, particularly in relation to exposure to multiple and interlocking forms of discrimination. This paper presents findings from a secondary analysis of Te Kupenga 2013, the first Māori Social Survey, examining patterning and prevalence of different forms of discrimination for Māori (n = 5,549). Māori report experiencing multiple forms of discrimination, both over their lifetimes and within the last year. Although racial discrimination was the most commonly reported form, Māori also experience discrimination on the basis of other grounds including age, gender, and income. Māori also report exposure to multiple forms of discrimination. Discrimination occurred in a range of settings, with schools and workplaces common sites. The findings support the lived reality of Māori that racial and other forms of discrimination are pervasive, and experienced in multiple domains across the life course, representing a persistent breach of rights. It is critical that other forms of discrimination are measured alongside racism in order to understand and address the realities of multiple discrimination for Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand.

In this article I examine some of the challenges for Māori and Local Government on the path to Treaty-based Local Government relationships. I suggest significant challenges exist in three core areas. The first relates to the attitudes towards the ideas of Treaty-based Local Government and evident in common terminology which has a narrow focus on the identity of Māori as ‘representatives' rather than ‘Treaty partners’. The second area of challenge is in having Māori wards/constituencies established which, when they are established, are symbolically the beginnings of an acknowledgment of Treaty obligations and relationships. The third challenge is the lack of good data which limits understandings of Māori involvement in Local Government. In the second part of the article I ask whether any specific challenges can be seen that might impact on Treaty-based relationships in regard to Māori involvement as candidates and voters in Local Government elections.

The Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA) was introduced "to promote prospecting for, exploration for, and mining of Crown owned minerals for the benefit of New Zealand". A series of fundamental questions has emerged as to whether the Act undermines the ability of the Crown and tangata whenua, anchored in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, to operate in a true sense of partnership. Carl Billington takes a closer look.