Full bibliography

Between 1991 and 1994, Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations Douglas Graham and the recently established Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit developed a series of policy proposals that outlined an ambitious plan to settle Māori historical treaty claims. These papers were refined via extensive consultation and discussion with Cabinet Ministers and government officials: Māori as treaty partner were not consulted. In late 1994 the proposed policy was approved by Cabinet and published as Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims. Why did the Crown decide to settle Māori historical treaty claims in the early 1990s? What did it expect to gain from settling treaty claims? Why, after nearly a century and a half of relative complacency, and nearly two decades after the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal to hear and make recommendations on Māori grievances, was the Crown suddenly prompted into action? And why would a right wing National government with little support from Māori voters and few current or previous Māori MPs launch a treaty claims settlement policy that would greatly antagonize its traditional voting base? These questions will be addressed via an examination of Cabinet papers, policy documents, legislation, deeds of settlement, published accounts and interviews with some of the key players. It will be argued that the treaty claims settlement policy was initiated as a consequence of New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General 1987, popularly known as the Lands case, and developed to achieve three specific outcomes: diversion of claimants away from the Waitangi Tribunal, containment of the financial risks posed by the Tribunal’s newly found binding and resumptive powers, and a progressive ‘winding back’ of Māori rights and Crown obligations embedded in legislation.