Your search

While Māori (the indigenous people of New Zealand) retain a strong collective identity, cultural heterogeneity renders traditional conceptualisations of Māori identity increasingly problematic. To demonstrate the diverse ways Māori define and express their own identities, this article reports research that uses life-story interviews to explore personal perceptions of identity among 35 Māori women ages 18–75. Content analysis revealed traditional cultural factors (particularly whānau/family commitment) were important for identity among all participants, although the expression of these factors differed along with age and background. Older women raised in rural communities expressed family commitment through participating in social and economic activities within their own tribal networks. Younger, urbanised Māori expressed their identities by choosing careers which advanced Māori interests, supporting Māori political aspirations, and forming close relationships with other urban Māori. Life-story excerpts are used to illustrate distinct intergenerational differences in expressions of Māori identity as well as descriptions of “Māoriness,” seldom articulated in literature on the topic. The need to expand current paradigms of Māori identity to incorporate the diversity of group members is emphasised.

This research examines the settler colonial legacy of Aotearoa New Zealand. It shows that biculturalism has emerged as a discursive byproduct of neoliberalism and settler colonialism. Simon’s recent work and the Te Paparahi o Te Raki Waitangi Tribunal decision aligns with the view of a significant paradigm shift since biculturalism suppresses affirmation of and mana motuhake. Biculturalism can be viewed through Moreton-Robinson’s white possessive lens as well as Beck's zombie concepts, which are used to prop up deteriorating and/or fictional social institutions. As a zombie concept in Aotearoa New Zealand, “biculturalism” supports settler/invader power structures. Indigenous communities disproportionately experience the destructive consequences of neoliberal policies and statecraft. Aotearoa New Zealand’s collective future requires abandoning biculturalism; to that end the author recommends revising common historiographic thought concerning Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Treaty of Waitangi) and the concept of “settling”.

The English Laws Act, passed in 1858, declared the Laws of England applicable in New Zealand and cemented the hitherto alien ideology of land as property. Part of this ideology was the separation of tangata from whenua along with the separation of ownership of land from ownership of water. Māori, as tangata whenua – people of the land, made no such distinctions. Ownership affects how people ‘manage’ whenua (land), make decisions and account to the legal system. Under English law, financial considerations are at the forefront. In contrast, Māori kaitiakitanga values are concerned with the interests of land, understanding that the best interests of people will follow. Despite stark contrasts between the ideology of land as property and the ethics of kaitiakitanga – obligation, sustainability and nurture – Māori engage with mainstream agencies and lead by example in efforts to promote the wellbeing of people and environments in a unified approach. This paper outlines competing paradigms, changing relationships and challenges faced by communities who seek to nurture and respect whenua in the face of colonization. Interview data from Māori involved in community land-based initiatives illustrates past and present struggles and what some possibilities might be for the future.

In Aotearoa New Zealand, the arrival of imperial ideologies in the 19th century led to devastating land-loss and cultural marginalisation for M?ori at the hands of settlers and successive governments. This article examines the damaging effects of a Crown-imposed treaty claims settlement system designed to address injustices inflicted on M?ori. Interview data from a Taranaki-based (a West Coast region, central North Island of Aotearoa New Zealand) hap? (sub-tribe) that engaged with this system foreground the adversarial nature of this system and its continuation of trauma. We argue that, while the process provides voice to M?ori, it does so within a paradigm that pits kin-groups against each other, unjustly limits redress and fails to resolve tension. A tikanga framing provides insights into how tensions are set up and ways tikanga (underlying values and principles that guide practice) can be used outside the redress system to seek healing and resolution.

In recent years Maori people have adopted many strategies to protect and advance the well being and visions implicit in the exercise of tino rangatiratanga. Much of that work has been done at home, but an increasing number of Iwi and other Maori organisations are now participating in international affairs that are seen to have some relevance to our lives. They are joining a worldwide movement by Indigenous Peoples to reassert their rights and reclaim their rightful place.

In 1840, English officials on behalf of the British crown signed the Treaty of Waitangi—also known as Te Tiriti o Waitangi—with the Indigenous Māori population, affirming Māori sovereignty and guaranteeing their collective rights to the country’s land and resources. Since the 1700s, English settlers had been arriving in Aotearoa (the Māori name for New Zealand) to capitalize on the seal and whale trade. As the number of settlers increased, reports flowed back to Britain of general lawlessness and dubious private land deals, and the crown was forced to consider how best to control its citizens. A treaty with the Māori, officials decided, was the way to do so. The agreement, which established the basis for the relationship between the Māori and the British, is commonly cited as a shining example of how a treaty can recognize and protect Indigenous peoples’ rights by curtailing the reach of the state. But does te Tiriti live up to its sterling reputation? The answer, of course, is complicated.

Communities of colour are racialised and oppressed differentially by settler colonial states (Saranillio, 2013), yet the discourse of diversity and inclusion that dominates state interactions with communities of colour tends to conflate marginalised groups as equivalent and interchangeable to the detriment of intergroup relations. An approach to community building that recognises racial difference in general and the irreducibility of indigeneity in particular is needed if racialised communities are to create solidarities for transformative change. We engage Indigenous and settler colonial theories to address these imperatives, while noting the distinct character of these frameworks. In particular, we seek to highlight the specificity of indigeneity in settler colonial contexts, such as Aotearoa New Zealand, and to generate a model for relationship building that is not founded on settler colonial ideologies, by drawing on Indigenous concepts. Through thematic analysis of interviews with Māori community leaders, we explore Māori-–tauiwi (settler) of colour (ToC) relations. The results of our qualitative analysis provide evidence for Māori–ToC relations that are consistent with whanaungatanga (good relationships characterised as family-like, based on similar experiences, and bound in conditional solidarity; see Benton, Frame, and Meredith, 2013). Furthermore, we identify the following four aspects of whakawhanaungatanga (relationship building): positioning, power sharing, dialogue and cultural practice. Thus, we suggest whakawhanaungatanga as a Māori approach to relationship building with the potential to generate Indigenous–settler of colour solidarities towards transformative change.

This paper theorizes how knowledge of indigenous tribal epistemologies was made ‘knowable’ through Enlightenment rationalism in an early colonial context. Specifically, the paper determines how and what knowledge of Mäori tribal physical activities was interpreted and authenticated through early travellers' tales and missionaries’ accounts in New Zealand. The central thesis argues that what was established as authentic and truthful aligned with Enlightenment rationalism, while those Mäori physical practices incomprehensible to Western understandings were deemed inauthentic and, consequently, were obscured and/or discarded. Throughout, the article theorizes the translation of knowledge into meaningful Western discourses and how these translations came to be crystallized in the colonial imagination.

This article explains that the concept of citizenship for Maori in New Zealand has evolved. The 'Native Rights Act 1865' declared all Maori to be subjects of the Crown. This implication then justified the confiscation of lands in the 1860s from those Maori deemed to be disloyal to the Crown. By the beginning of the twentieth century, politicians began to use the concept of citizenship to force Maori to fight in World War I. In the mid-twentieth century, the Maori politician Apirana Ngata used the term 'price of citizenship' to gain social and political rights for all Maori, as a result of the efforts of Maori soldiers fighting as New Zealand citizens in World War II.

Governments in New Zealand have legislated a large number of settlements extinguishing many hundreds of claims taken by Māori against the Crown for breaches of the country’s founding document, Te Tiriti o Waitangi. They portray settlements as a great success for Māori and the Crown. Māori disagree. Settlements are government-determined and imposed on Māori using a smoke and mirrors approach that masks successive governments’ true intentions: to claw back Māori legal rights; to extinguish all claims; and to maintain White control over Māori. In short, to uphold the Doctrine of Discovery in further breach of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Māori claimants and negotiators report being enticed into the process by false promises only to become traumatised and disenchanted. Yet many take a pragmatic stance and sign settlements, making the best they can out of a bad deal that goes nowhere near compensating for their actual loss. They know that despite what legislation may say, the settlements are not full, not fair and not final and that, like all previous settlements, they will be revisited. They also know that unless fundamental changes are made to the constitutional makeup of the country, there is no prospect of justice and reconciliation for Māori.

This article considers research conducted on the impact of the Crown’s treaty claims settlement policy on Māori in New Zealand. It provides a brief background to the Treaty of Waitangi and the subsequent British colonisation process that relied on the Doctrine of Discovery in breach of the treaty. It outlines how colonisation dispossessed Māori of 95 percent of their lands and resources, usurped Māori power and authority and left them in a state of poverty, deprivation and marginalisation while procuring considerable wealth, prosperity and privilege for British settlers. The work of the Waitangi Tribunal, the commission of inquiry set up to investigate those breaches, is considered, as is the Crown’s reaction to the 1987 Lands case in developing its treaty claims settlement policy. The Crown unilaterally imposed the policy despite vehement opposition from Māori. Since 1992, it has legislated more than seventy ‘settlements’. The research shows that overall, the process has traumatised claimants, divided their communities, and returned on average less than one percent of their stolen lands. Proposals for constitutional transformation have drawn widespread support from Māori as a solution to British colonisation. United Nations treaty-monitoring bodies have recommended that the government discuss this with Māori

Māori leaders in New Zealand continue the battle to end British colonisation. The aim is to restore the balance between Māori and the Crown guaranteed in the treaty that Māori and the British Crown agreed to in 1840 so that we can live in peace and harmony. Early European visitors subjected our ancestors to numerous atrocities. Relying on the Doctrine of Discovery, they illegitimately usurped our power and dispossessed us, leaving us in a state of poverty, deprivation and marginalisation. They fabricated myths to justify their criminal activities, set up an illegitimate parliament with unfettered powers, passed laws legalising their crimes and then covered it up with amnesia. They established the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 to inquire into breaches of the treaty, not realising that it would dismantle the myths and look beneath the amnesia. Governments then instigated the ‘treaty claims settlement’ process to extinguish all Māori claims, remove Māori rights and entrench colonisation. Research undertaken has shown that Māori loathe this process and do not accept that settlements are full and final. Research on constitutional transformation has identified a possible solution. The first step towards that goal involves implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Argues that Māori have been actively engaged in practising tino rangatiratanga in various forms even since before the Declaration of Independence ...

Abstract Christian public theology extends reconciliation beyond its principal sacramental concern for relationships between God and penitent to the construction of ‘socially just’ public relationships for the settlement of intra-national conflict. In theological terms, reconciliation brings public relationships into what Hally calls ‘the Christ narrative of passion, death and resurrection’ in which the perpetrators of injustice repent and seek forgiveness. This article introduces the conflicts that these discourses aim to resolve in Australia, Fiji and New Zealand and explains and contrasts reconciliation’s relative importance in each of these jurisdictions. Moreover, the article’s cross-jurisdictional comparison shows reconciliation’s limits and possibilities as public theology, and argues that in Australia and New Zealand it has helped to create political environments willing to admit indigenous perspectives on a range of policy issues. On the contrary, however, the article also shows that the Fijian churches have distorted the concept of reconciliation to support political imperatives that are difficult to rationalize theologically, even though they are presented by the churches as being concerned with religious goals.