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  • This article outlines the fraudulent practices of settler traders and land agents who employed alcohol to facilitate the alienation of Maori lands, highlighting the close relationship between Maori, liquor and land loss in 19th century New Zealand. Traders and agents developed a range of strategies, forged in Britain, tempered by colonial experience and wielded with deft precision in New Zealand to defraud Maori of their lands. Government efforts to pre-empt and prevent the worst excesses of settler crime proved ineffectual, self-defeating, paternalistic and ultimately unenforceable. Maori came to regard settler practices, the successive failure of legislation to alleviate the problem, and state connections with the liquor industry to be part of a thinly veiled conspiracy to destabilize their communities and alienate their lands. While this conclusion is highly problematic, it is likely that traders and agents had witnessed or were aware of similar practices in the settler colonies of Australia, Canada and North America, and made good use of them in New Zealand to access Maori lands.

  • Between 1991 and 1994, Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations Douglas Graham and the recently established Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit developed a series of policy proposals that outlined an ambitious plan to settle Māori historical treaty claims. These papers were refined via extensive consultation and discussion with Cabinet Ministers and government officials: Māori as treaty partner were not consulted. In late 1994 the proposed policy was approved by Cabinet and published as Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims. Why did the Crown decide to settle Māori historical treaty claims in the early 1990s? What did it expect to gain from settling treaty claims? Why, after nearly a century and a half of relative complacency, and nearly two decades after the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal to hear and make recommendations on Māori grievances, was the Crown suddenly prompted into action? And why would a right wing National government with little support from Māori voters and few current or previous Māori MPs launch a treaty claims settlement policy that would greatly antagonize its traditional voting base? These questions will be addressed via an examination of Cabinet papers, policy documents, legislation, deeds of settlement, published accounts and interviews with some of the key players. It will be argued that the treaty claims settlement policy was initiated as a consequence of New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General 1987, popularly known as the Lands case, and developed to achieve three specific outcomes: diversion of claimants away from the Waitangi Tribunal, containment of the financial risks posed by the Tribunal’s newly found binding and resumptive powers, and a progressive ‘winding back’ of Māori rights and Crown obligations embedded in legislation.

Last update from database: 8/18/26, 4:14 AM (UTC)